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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a class of false analog 
data injection attack that can misguide the system as if topology 
errors had occurred. By utilizing the measurement redundancy 
with respect to the state variables, the adversary who knows the 
system configuration is shown to be capable of computing the 
corresponding measurement value with the intentionally 
misguided topology. The attack is designed such that the state as 
well as residue distribution after state estimation will converge to 
those in the system with a topology error. It is shown that the 
attack can be launched even if the attacker is constrained to some 
specific meters. The attack is detrimental to the system since 
manipulation of analog data will lead to a forged digital topology 
status, and the state after the error is identified and modified will 
be significantly biased with the intended wrong topology. The 
feasibility of the proposed attack is demonstrated with an IEEE 
14-bus system. 
Keywords—False data injection attacks, state estimation, 
topology errors, power system monitoring 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In modern power systems, topology processor (TP) 
performs analysis on the status of circuit breakers (CBs) to 
determine the system model, which can be further used in state 
estimation (SE). The status of CBs is correct and known most 
of the time, but in some cases the assumed status may turn out 
to be erroneous [1]. This happens when isolation switches are 
not telemetered or operated. Other possible causes may include 
unreported breaker manipulation, communication failure, cyber 
attacks, etc. In these cases, the topology model given by TP will 
be an incorrect one, which will entail a topology error. 
Topology errors usually cause the state estimation to be 
significantly biased, mainly because of the mismatch between 
measurements and system nodal admittance matrix. Apart from 
inaccurate results and convergence problems in state estimation, 
topology error may also cause bad data detection process to 
malfunction. 
False data injection attack (FDIA) was first introduced in [2] 
and this class of cyber attack can mislead state estimation 
process by adding false data to measurements. Related work on 
FDIA can be roughly classified into the following categories. 
Unmitigated FDIA against SE [3]—[6], economic attacks on 
electricity market [7]—[9], detection and protection methods 
against FDIA [10], [11]. 
In this paper, we examine the possibility of false data 
injection which may misguide the system with incorrect 
topology. Without having to compromise the circuit breaker 
status, the adversary is shown to be capable of manipulating a 
topology error by adding false data injection to a number of 
analog measurements in the system. The attack is designed such 
that measurement residues will comply with the distribution of 
residues in the system with target topology error. Meanwhile, 
the difference between actual state values and theoretical state 
values is also minimized to match with topology error and avoid 
further detection based on state variables. The attack can 
mislead the system operators if the status of compromised 
branch is unknown or hacked. And after detection and 
identification of the designed topology error, adjusting system 
topology accordingly will lead the system to a biased SE result. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces 
topology errors and existing detection methods. Section III 
illustrates the attack model towards topology errors. Simulation 
results of the proposed attack are given in Section IV and 
Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. TOPOLOGY ERRORS 
This paper starts with the formulation of DC state 
estimation, although the proposed approach is generalizable 
towards AC state estimation as well. In DC state estimation, the 
relationship between measurements and state variables is 
linearized. Measurement model can be written as: 
 ࢠ ൌ ࡴ࢞ ൅ ࢋ 
where ࢠ is real measurements, ࢞ is vector of bus angles and ࢋ 
is measurement error vector. ࡴ is the measurement Jacobian 
matrix. 
The estimated state can be derived using Weighted Least 
Square (WLS) method:  
 ࢞ෝ ൌ ሺࡴࢀࡾି૚ࡴሻି૚ࡴࢀࡾି૚ࢠ 
where ࡾି૚ is diagonal weighting matrix. 
And the residue can be given:  
 ࢘ ൌ ࢠ െࡴ࢞ෝ 
Based on (1) - (3), the following equations can be derived:  
 ࡹ ൌ ࡴሺࡴࢀࡾି૚ࡴሻି૚ࡴࢀࡾି૚ 
 ࢘ ൌ ሺࡵ െࡹሻࢋ 
Expected value of the residue after WLS state estimation:  
 ܧሺ࢘ሻ ൌ ૙ 
Errors in the status of breakers and switches will lead to 
incorrect information about network topology [12]. Topology 
errors are known to have more influence on measurement 
residues than parameter errors mainly because of the mismatch 
on ࡴ  matrix [13]. Let ࡴ࢚  be the system true measurement Jacobian matrix and ࡴࢋ be the erroneous Jacobian matrix, then the error of the above Jacobian matrices which is caused by 
topology errors can be given as: 
 ࡰ ൌ ࡴ࢚ െ ࡴࢋ 
For a single branch status error, the non-zero elements in 
error Jacobian matrix ࡰ  are the first derivative of related 
measurements (injections on both buses and power flows on the 
branch) with respect to state variables (phase angles) of both 
buses. With known topology errors in the system, the 
measurement residue then becomes: 
 ࢘ ൌ ሺࡵ െࡹࢋሻሺࡰ࢞ ൅ ࢋሻ 
 ࡹࢋ ൌ ࡴࢋሺࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚ࡴࢋሻି૚ࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚ 
And the expected value of the residue with topology error: 
 ܧሺ࢘ሻ ൌ ሺࡵ െࡹࢋሻࡰ࢞ 
There exist certain types of topology errors that are non-
detectable. Existing detection algorithms [12], [14], [15] 
commonly use measurement residue to detect and identify 
topology errors. A topology error is assumed to be detectable if 
ሺࡵ െࡹࢋሻࡰ࢞ ് ૙ for any state ࢞. When a detectable topology error is present in the system, the bias vector can be represented 
as: 
 ࡰ࢞ ൌ ࡸࢌ 
where ࡸ is measurement to branch incidence matrix and ࢌ is 
branch flow error vector. 
The detection for a detectable topology error in the system 
can be dealt with using normalized residues [12]. From (11), it 
can be seen that the distribution of measurement residue of a 
system with topology error is related to both system topology 
and branch flow errors. 
III. ATTACK MODEL  
A. Preliminary 
State estimation is usually solved as an overdetermined 
system, where there are more measurements than state variables 
and WLS method is commonly used to estimate the system state. 
Given a set of measurements ࢠ, the overdetermined system is 
able to obtain a unique estimated state ࢞. Inversely, if given a 
fixed state ࢞, the following linear system can be derived: 
 ࡴࢀࡾି૚ࢠ ൌ ሺࡴࢀࡾି૚ࡴሻ࢞ෝ ൌ ࢈ 
During state estimation, once ࢞ෝ is determined and system 
topology is known then the right hand side of the above 
equation can be calculated. Consider z as unknown variables, 
then the coefficient matrix for the system is ࡴࢀࡾି૚ , which 
normally has more columns than rows. Furthermore, since the 
row vectors of system Jacobian matrix are linearly independent, 
ࡴࢀࡾି૚  is a full rank matrix. Suppose we have ݉ 
measurements and ݊ state variables, then for the above system: 
 ݎܽ݊݇ሺࡴࢀࡾି૚ሻ ൌ ݎܽ݊݇ሺࡴࢀࡾି૚|࢈ሻ ൌ ݊ ൏ ݉ 
The system becomes underdetermined and according to 
Rouché-Capelli theorem, there will be infinite number of 
solutions.  
 
Fig. 1. Overdetermined and underdetermined systems 
The underdetermined system as well as the parallelism in 
determining measurements provides possibilities of false data 
injection attacks in state estimation. The overdetermined and 
underdetermined systems are described in Fig. 1. 
B. False data injection attacks 
The goal of the proposed attack is to generate a topology 
error in the system by adding false data to system 
measurements. The attack will not compromise topology 
processor or circuit breakers, instead the attacker will utilize 
the redundancy in state estimation and manipulate 
measurement data to compensate the influence caused by the 
mismatch of Jacobian matrix through the topology error so that 
the system will appear to have a topology error. 
Suppose the attacker knows the measurement data as well as 
system topology information a short time before the false data 
injection attack. Measurement data and Jacobian matrix at this 
stage can be denoted as ࢠ and ࡴ࢚. The real time measurement data taken right on/before the attack can be denoted as ࢠ࢚. If the attacker is able to get the information about system right 
before the attack or can manipulate measurement data before 
it is obtained from the SCADA system, then ࢠ can be treated 
as real time measurement data. 
With measurement data ࢠ࢚  and the topology information. The attacker is able to conduct state estimation based on the 
wrong topology. Given an intended topology, the measurement 
Jacobian matrix ࡴࢋ ൌ ࡴ࢚ െ ࡰ  will be used in the state estimation: 
 ࢞෥ ൌ ሺࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚ࡴࢋሻି૚ࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚ࢠ࢚ 
The state above is the one when the system actually has a 
topology error and the attacker will expect that the state after 
the attack can be as close as possible to this state. 
Assume the system topology does not change during the 
short time before the attack, the real time measurement 
Jacobian matrix can be known instantly since the non-zero 
elements in ܪ matrix are the line susceptance in the system. 
During real time state estimation, ࡴ࢚ will be used as Jacobian matrix because the attacker only manipulate analog data but 
does not actually attack topology processor. 
Therefore, for the real time state estimation the only 
unknown parameters are measurements since we already know 
ܪ matrix based on system topology and estimated state based 
on (14). The real time measurement data, which is the attacked 
one, can be represented as: 
 ࢠࢇ ൌ ࢠ࢚ ൅ ࢇ 
where ࢇ is the false data vector on the measurement. 
In most ideal situation, the adversary would expect the 
following equation to hold after the attack: 
 ሺࡴ࢚ࢀࡾି૚ࡴ࢚ሻ࢞෥ ൌ ࡴ࢚ࢀࡾି૚ࢠࢇ 
After the false data injection, the attacker would want the 
system to identify it as a topology error rather than a malicious 
attack. The measurement residue distribution will change 
when the power flow values are compromised, but the attacker 
can easily find a legitimate measurement residue that is close 
to the residue in the ideal situation: 
 ‖ሺࢠࢇ െ ࡴ࢚࢞෥ሻ െ ሺࡵ െࡹࢋሻࡰ࢞෥‖ஶ ൏ ߝ 
where ࡹࢋ ൌ ࡴࢋሺࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚ࡴࢋሻି૚ࡴࢋࢀࡾି૚, ࡰ ൌ ࡴ࢚ െ ࡴࢋ and ߝ is the threshold. 
The state in (17) should be ሺࡴ࢚ࢀࡾି૚ࡴ࢚ሻି૚ࡴ࢚ࢀࡾି૚ࢠࢇ if (16) does not hold. Under the assumption that (16) holds or the 
difference between both sides is small enough, ࢞෥ can be used 
as state vector in (17). The threshold can be adjusted and allow 
some violations for large systems. 
The attacked measurement as well as the false data vector is 
bounded due to the constraint in (17). The determination of the 
entire set of measurement data not only needs to approach the 
estimated state in (14) after the state estimation but also needs 
to comply with the restrictions on the residue. 
Suppose the system is free of attacks, then the real time state 
can be forecasted. State forecasting has been discussed in [10], 
[16], [17]. Autoregressive (AR) model can be used to forecast 
the state. The ݅th state variable on time ݐ can be expressed as: 
 ݔ௧௜ ൌ ∑ ൫߮௝௜ݔ௧ି௝௜൯ ൅ ݒ௧௜௣௝ୀଵ  
where ݌  is AR process order, ߮  is AR parameters and ݒ௧  is modeling uncertainties. 
Parameter ߮ can be represented with autocorrelations and 
solved using Yule-Walker equations. For each state variable, 
its AR parameter: 
 ൦
߮ଵ߮ଶ⋮
߮௣
൪ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ۍ 1 ߩଵ ⋯ ߩ௣ିଵߩଵ 1 ⋯ ߩ௣ିଶ
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where ߩ௞ is the ݇th lag autocorrelation. 
During the state forecasting, the dynamic model of system 
state is usually given as: 
 ࢚࢞ ൌ ࡲ࢚࢚࢞ି૚ ൅ ࢚࢜ 
where ࡲ࢚ is the state transition matrix. 
Note that ࢚࢞ above is different from the estimated state in (14) which is the state with topology error in the system. After 
the attack with system topology errors, the attacker would also 
want to see an obvious difference between the state after attack 
and the forecasted state, otherwise the attack itself is 
meaningless. The restriction on target state and the forecasted 
state is provided below, where ߜ is the threshold set before the 
attack. Note that if the attack data is prepared a short time 
before the attack for a detectable topology error, then (21) 
usually holds. 
 ‖࢞෥ െ ࢚࢞‖૛ ൐ ߜ 
Additionally, in real attack the adversary may only have 
access to limited number of measurements and the attack on 
each measurement may be restrained as well: 
 ࢠࢇ࢓࢏࢔ ൑ ࢠࢇ ൑ ࢠࢇ࢓ࢇ࢞ 
Therefore, based on all the discussion above, the attack can 
be formulated as an optimization problem: 
minimizeࢠࢇ 				ฮሺࡴ࢚
ࢀࡾି૚ࡴ࢚ሻ࢞෥ െ ࡴ࢚ࢀࡾି૚ࢠࢇฮ૛  
																subject	to 							ࢠࢇ࢓࢏࢔ ൑ ࢠࢇ ൑ ࢠࢇ࢓ࢇ࢞  
																																			 						‖ሺࢠࢇ െ ࡴ࢚࢞෥ሻ െ ሺࡵ െࡹࢋሻࡰ࢞෥‖ஶ ൏ ߝ  
																																			 						‖࢞෥ െ ࢚࢞‖૛ ൐ ߜ  
where ࢠࢇ࢓࢏࢔ and ࢠࢇ࢓ࢇ࢞ are lower and upper bound of attacked measurements, the setup of which can be determined before the 
attack. For the measurement that the attacker is unable to 
compromise, fix the value of ࢠࢇ࢓࢏࢔ and ࢠࢇ࢓ࢇ࢞, after which the constraint of that measurement will turn into an equality 
constraint. 
The attacker is able to obtain an optimal measurement data 
set for the intended attack on system topology with the above 
formulation. After the above optimization problem is solved, 
one can also easily get the attack vector ࢇ ൌ ࢠࢇ െ ࢠ࢚, which is also the false data to be injected to the measurement data. 
 
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
     In this section, we illustrate the attack on the IEEE-14 bus 
system. A false data injection attack is performed with a forged 
topology error and an inclusion error is considered on branch 3-
4. The branch is believed to be in service when it is actually 
open. The attacked 14-bus system is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. IEEE 14-bus system 
Suppose the attacker is only able to compromise limited 
number of meters in the system during the attack. The 
measurements that cannot be attacked including injections and 
power flows are labelled in Fig. 2. 
Assume the attacker can manage to obtain the measurement 
data a short time before the attack, the threshold ߝ in (17) is set 
to be 0.8 in this example. Measurements considered are real 
injection and real power flows (including reverse power flows), 
and measurement set can be denoted as ݖ ൌ ሾ ௜ܲ, ௜ܲ௝, ௝ܲ௜ሿ் . There are 54 measurement data in the system and after solving 
the proposed optimization problem, the attacker is able to get 
an optimal solution for ࢠࢇ.  
 
Fig. 3. Measurements before and after the attack 
The measurements before and after the attack are shown in 
Fig. 3. The measurements that cannot be hacked as shown in 
Fig. 2 include power injections ௜ܲ(ݖ௞, ݇ ∈ ሼ1,2,5,6,11,12,13ሽ), real power flows ௜ܲ௝  (ݖ௞, ݇ ∈ ሼ15,16,19,21,24,25,26,27,33ሽ) 
and power flows ௝ܲ௜  (ݖ௞, ݇ ∈ ሼ35,36,39,41,44,45,46,47,53ሽ). 
These measurements are treated as inaccessible to the attacker, 
thus the value cannot be changed during the attack. The attack 
vector ࢇ ൌ ࢠࢇ െ ࢠ࢚ is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Measurement attack vector 
Since the measurements labelled in Fig. 2 are inaccessible to 
the attacker, the corresponding value of the attack vector should 
be zero, as shown in Fig. 4. After introducing the attack bias 
above, the system will have a residue that corresponds to a 
topology error on branch 3-4 as shown in Fig. 5, where the 
incident measurement residues of branch 3-4 are usually 
evident. 
 
Fig. 5. Measurement residue after the attack 
The objective function value of the attack model at solution 
is 0.0212. Basically the system state after the attack is 
equivalent to the theoretical state value ࢞෥  in (14). The 
comparison of the state after attack and the theoretical one is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Theoretical state and state after the attack 
The difference of theoretical state value and actual state value 
at each bus (apart from slack bus) is small, as indicated in Fig. 
7.  
 
Fig. 7. Difference of state value at each bus 
In this attack example, the absolute value of difference at 
each bus is below 0.01 degree. After the attack, it can be seen 
that the state values match perfectly with the theoretical values. 
Even with limited number of compromised measurements, the 
attacker is still able to forge a topology error in the system with 
a target state. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a type of false analog data injection 
attack that can forge a topology error in the system. The attacker 
only needs to falsify analog measurement data to attack the 
system topology. Calculating measurement value given state 
values is an underdetermined problem, therefore the adversary 
is able to generate multiple attack bias as a result of system 
redundancy. The attack vector can be obtained by solving an 
optimization problem, after which the state value should 
converge to the theoretical state value. A theoretical state value 
is computed at the beginning based on intended topology and 
then the attacker will conduct a reverse estimation on 
measurement values through an optimization model. Even with 
limited number of target measurements, the attacker is still able 
to finish an attack towards system topology errors. 
The proposed attack on topology is detrimental to the system 
since the manipulation on analog measurement data by the 
attacker would mislead the system operators to identify it as 
topology errors rather than unintended measurement bad data. 
And changing the branch status after detecting such errors will 
lead to a different system state result. 
The feasibility of the proposed false data injection attack is 
tested on IEEE 14-bus system. The attacker can expect better 
results if the number of inaccessible measurements is smaller 
and the system is larger, as it will bring more redundancy to the 
attack model. Future work may include detection and 
identification of such false data injection attacks. 
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